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ANTITHEATRICALITY AND
IRRATIONALITY: AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW
Kent R. Lehnhof

Over the last three decades, antitheatrical authors like Stephen Gosson,
Phillip Stubbes, and William Prynne have become increasingly visible in
the literary and cultural studies of the early modern period. Even so, the
tendency has been to treat these authors as ideological extremists: reactionary hacks whose opposition to stage plays originates in outrageous ideas of
the self, impossible notions of right and wrong, and bizarre beliefs about
humanity’s susceptibility to external suggestion. This characterization can
be traced back to several of the pioneering studies in the field, including
Jonas Barish’s The Antitheatrical Prejudice (1985) and Laura Levine’s Men
in Women’s Clothing (1994), each of which takes the irrationality of the antitheatricalists as a starting point, as well as a structuring assumption. Both of
these books have shaped our critical discourse: virtually everyone who has
written about antitheatricalism in recent years has been influenced by and
is indebted to the readings that these books present.1 Nevertheless, I believe
that these groundbreaking studies plowed the field in such a way as to distort
some of its contours. In the present essay, I offer a careful response in hopes
of giving us a better sense of the lay of the land.
While it might seem misguided or querulous of me to critique these
works in close detail, it is not my intent to deny or disparage their important contributions to the discipline. Indeed, it is precisely because these
books have been so influential that a response is worthwhile. My aim in
reviewing their claims is to cast light on our collective tendency to misconstrue the antitheatricalists’ meaning, which in turn keeps us from
appreciating what early modern antitheatrical debates are all about. It
is simply not the case that the antitheatricalists attack the stage because
they have outlandish beliefs about the self, while the apologists defend
it because they have well-considered ones. In point of fact, the conceptualization of human nature that informs the antitheatrical tracts is recognizably Protestant and culturally dominant in early modern England.
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Nevertheless, we often ignore this orthodoxy to emphasize instead what
seems illogical or eccentric. In doing so, we oversimplify a complex
sociocultural situation and turn antitheatrical discourse into a cartoonish
version of itself. In what follows, I seek to paint a more telling portrait by
showing how this assumption of irrationality has colored our criticism,
causing us to miss many of the qualifications, clarifications, and theorizations that make antitheatrical writings more compelling than we give
them credit for being. The antitheatricalists are not as senseless as we have
supposed, and their writings can give us real insight into the acute moral
and ethical problems posed by playmaking in early modern England, as
well as an ampler sense of the operation, influence, and significance of the
professional stage.
*

*

*

As one of the seminal studies in the field, Barish’s The Antitheatrical
Prejudice is remarkable in a number of ways. Its scope is impressive (ranging from antiquity to modernity), and its erudition is simply astounding. Nevertheless, the material that Barish chooses to present and the
manner in which he does so leave little doubt that we are meant to see
the antitheatricalists as incoherent and illogical. In the case of the early
modern moment, this is done by paying disproportionate attention to
William Prynne, the most ardent of all the English polemicists. Though
Barish readily admits that Prynne is an exceptional figure—not so much
an example of antitheatrical thought as a grotesque caricature of it—he
nevertheless turns to Prynne again and again to represent the antitheatrical position. Indeed, the chapter in Barish’s book that focuses on the early
modern English controversy (“Puritans and Proteans”) quotes Prynne
four times as frequently as any other author.2
This quotational bias makes for interesting reading (since Prynne’s
tone and style are nothing if not striking), but it ultimately encourages us
to think of the whole of antitheatrical ideology in terms of Prynne’s particular intemperance, as if the extreme were the mean. This has the effect
of undermining the enterprise—an effect that Barish only intensifies by
making pseudoscientific claims about Prynne’s mental condition. For
even as Barish makes Prynne out to be the model of the antitheatrical
movement, he labels the man a “megalomaniac” and describes his excursus against the stage as “a logorrhaeic nightmare” and “an exercise in
pathology.”3 According to Barish, no one would even consider w
 riting a
text like Prynne’s Histrio-mastix (1632) unless he was trying to “to work
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off a staggering load of resentment and anxiety.” Histrio-mastix is, Barish
advises, the work of one who is “terrified, maddened, by the fear of total
breakdown” (87). By placing Prynne’s writings within such a frame,
Barish shifts the focus from antitheatricalism per se to the neuroses from
which it is supposed to spring. By treating every statement as a symptom
of some deeper disturbance, Barish renders Prynne’s actual objections
irrelevant: the ravings of a troubled mind. Such an approach is patently
prejudicial. One can only wonder how close we are coming to an accurate
understanding of the antitheatrical movement when Barish is filtering
all of it to us through the life and writings of one whom he alleges to be
either insane or possessed: “goaded by a devil,” as Barish writes, “. . . to
blacken the theater with lunatic exaggeration” (87).
When treating antitheatrical authors other than Prynne, Barish is not
as heavy-handed, but he continues to suggest that they should not be taken
seriously. After pointing out, for instance, that Stephen Gosson faults
players for violating the Deuteronomic prohibition against men wearing women’s garments, Barish writes, “Like other antitheatricalists . . .,
Gosson stubbornly overlooks the long tradition according to which a number of female saints, in apostolic days, dressed as men in order to escape
their persecutors” (90). By claiming that Gosson “stubbornly o verlooks” this
tradition, Barish implies that Gosson argues in bad faith, willfully omitting
important information. Yet Barish nowhere establishes that an early modern Protestant like Gosson would have known about or approved of these
cross-dressed saints from the first century. Furthermore, Barish glosses over
the fact that historical examples of women dressing as men does not exactly
authorize men to dress as women—especially when they do so not to preserve their lives but to please their paying c ustomers. Nevertheless, Barish’s
insinuation here, as elsewhere, is that the antitheatricalists are untrustworthy. To argue as they do, one must either be either mentally imbalanced
(like Prynne) or intellectually dishonest (like Gosson).
Of course, Barish is not exactly enamored of the early modern apologists, either. He describes Thomas Heywood as “spectacularly inept” and
savages his Apology for Actors (1612) as an “extraordinarily thoughtless
piece of polemic” (119, 118). Of this treatise, Barish claims, “It would be
hard to imagine a more inept ‘apology.’ . . . Heywood’s bungling is such
that he is constantly thrusting weapons into the hands of his a dversaries”
(119–20). However, it must be noted that the pejoratives applied to
Heywood are of a different order than those applied to the antitheatricalists. Whereas Prynne was insane, Heywood was simply incompetent.
And by portraying Heywood as ham-fisted rather than hysterical, Barish
implies that the case to be made for the theater is perfectly reasonable and
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coherent. The only reason Heywood cannot pull it off is because he is
“slack,” “desultory,” “artless,” and “clumsy” (117, 118, 121).
Throughout The Antitheatrical Prejudice, then, Barish treats antitheatricalism as precisely that—a prejudice. This assumption, however, does
us no favors. When we tell ourselves the antitheatricalists are irrational,
we tend to read them ungenerously, which causes us to misconstrue their
meaning. We can see this happening throughout Levine’s Men in Women’s
Clothing. When Levine, for instance, writes about the pamphlets of
Stephen Gosson, she describes them as eliding all forms of human agency.
According to Levine, Gosson’s pamphlets portray humanity as altogether lacking in will or volition—robots who have been programmed to
respond automatically to external stimuli:
Gosson’s view of human behavior implies a kind of
“domino theory” of the self. Human behavior is a chain of
degenerative action in which each act leads automatically to
the next—(“from pyping to playing, from play to pleasure,
from pleasure to slouth, from slouth to sleepe, from sleepe
to sinne, from sinne to death, from death to the Divel”).
Each action mechanically triggers the next without will
or volition. In fact it is as if the will has been permanently
disarmed, rendered inoperative.4
Yet the individual will that Gosson is supposed to disregard is right there
in the quoted passage. It’s just that Levine breaks it off before it has
time to appear. If we read Gosson’s sentence all the way to the end, we
see that he makes the whole process of “preferment” conditional upon
our consent:
[Poetry] preferres you too Pyping, from Pyping to playing,
from play to pleasure, from pleasure to slouth, from slouth
too sleepe, from sleepe too sinne, from sinne to death, from
death to the deuill, if you take your learning apace, and passe
through euery forme without reuolting.5
Though Gosson envisions seduction as a slippery slope, he not only allows
but also encourages us to resist or “revolt.” Contrary to the claim that
agency is inoperative in his account, Gosson grants us power—at any
point in the process—to dig in our heels and arrest our descent.
This might seem like a small thing, but it attests to our collective tendency to sensationalize antitheatrical discourse at the same time that it
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illustrates how this tendency can take us off track. In Men in Women’s
Clothing, this inclination is pervasive, manifesting itself in the first paragraph of the first chapter. This paragraph (which also serves as the book’s
blurb) generates considerable energy and interest by alleging an escalation or intensification in antitheatrical discourse over time:
Sometime in 1579, in a pamphlet which was to establish the
terms of attack and defense for another sixty years, Stephen
Gosson made the curious remark that theater “effeminated”
the mind. Four years later, in a pamphlet twice the size,
Phillip Stubbes clarified this claim even as he heightened
it by insisting that male actors who wore women’s clothing
could literally “adulterate” male gender. Fifty years later in
a one-thousand-page tract which may have hastened the
closing of the theatres, William Prynne described a man
whom women’s clothing had literally caused to “degenerate” into a woman. In the years of mounting pamphlet war
about the stage, the vague sense that theater could somehow soften the responses of the audience had been replaced
by the fear—expressed in virtually biological terms—that
theatre could structurally transform men into women.
(10, my emphasis)
What this escalation ostensibly reveals is the irrationality of the enterprise: the antitheatricalists allow their anxieties to spiral out of control
until they are making incredible claims about the playhouse’s power to
transform men into women, quite literally turning penises into vaginas.
This particular escalation, however, is more an effect of Levine’s rhetoric
than it is Gosson’s or Stubbes’s or Prynne’s. As my italics aim to show,
Levine creates a sense of intensification by placing the word “literally”
before the word pulled from Stubbes and the word pulled from Prynne.
Were it not for this adverb, there is little in the sequence effeminate →
adulterate → degenerate that would point us in the direction of increasing
literality. It only does so in Levine’s text because she modifies the last two
terms. When these terms are returned to context, however, we find that
they do not really carry the weight of literality that Levine would have
them bear.
The relevant passage in the Stubbes text, which glances at the practice
of using boy actors to impersonate women, focuses on apparel, not anatomy. “Our Apparel,” Stubbes writes, “was giuen vs as a signe distinctiue
to discern betwixt sex and sex, & therefore [for] one to weare the Apparel
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of another sex, is to participate with the same, and to adulterate the veritie
of his owne kinde.”6 Since the thing that is said to be adulterated here—
namely, “verity,” or truth—is so abstract, it is difficult to read this passage
“in virtually biological terms.” Unless we agree that for Stubbes the “truth
of mankind” is a penis, we are hard-pressed to interpret this statement
anatomically, as an escalation of Gosson’s anxieties.7
Similarly, the degeneration discussed by Prynne does not lend itself
to a literal reading. As with Stubbes, the term appears in a complaint
about cross-dressing. It is evident, though, that Prynne’s attention is on
the accoutrements of gender, not its genital structures. In the process of
describing the degeneration of the misattired man, Prynne refers to clothing, footwear, gait, and voice—none of which comprises the anatomical
transformation we have been led to expect:
Doth not that valiant man, that man of courage who is
admirable in his armes, and formidable to his enemies
degenerate into a woman with his veiled face? he lets his
coate hange downe to his ankles, he twists a girdle about his
breast, he puts on women’s shoes, and after the manner of
women, he puts a cawle upon his head; moreover he carries
about a distaffe with wooll, and drawes out a thred with his
right hand, wherewith he hath formerly borne a trophie,
and he extenuateth his spirit and voyce into a shriller and
womanish sound.8
While it is true that Prynne sees the cross-dressed man as assuming
the manners and mannerisms of a woman, this is not the same thing as
becoming one in a biological or structural sense. Like Stubbes before him,
Prynne is clearly anxious about effeminization, but Levine misrepresents
these concerns when she makes them more literal (and therefore more
outlandish) than they really are.
As an alternative to Levine’s literalistic approach, we would do well
to consider a number of more recent studies showing that sexually coded
language in early modern usage often has more to do with morality than
with morphology. Gina Hausknecht, for instance, has demonstrated that
even as John Milton uses gendered terms like “manly” and “masculine”
in his prose writings to refer to those who are committed to Christian liberty and civic virtue, he does so without any especial regard for anatomy.
Men can be insufficiently masculine, and women are not precluded from
assuming “masculine” moral positions. Accordingly, Milton’s discourse
of manliness should not be taken literally: it is “about the mind, and very
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specifically not about the body.”9 I propose that the same is generally true
of authors like Gosson, Stubbes, and Prynne. Before we adopt an anatomistic interpretation of their fears of effeminization, we should remember
that antitheatricalism is first and foremost an ethical discourse. As such,
its primary frame of reference is not material but moral. Consequently,
when antitheatrical authors use words like “effeminization,” “adulteration,” and “degeneration,” it is far more likely that they are referring to
a process of spiritual corruption whereby virtue is turned to vice than
they are a process of genital transformation in which penises are turned
into vaginas. The latter process may be fantastical, but the former is not
hard to imagine at all. One need not abandon logic to think that a lascivious interlude might induce an otherwise upright individual to slacken his
(or her) “manly” temperance and slide into “womanish” lust. As soon as
we entertain the idea that the antitheatricalists’ rhetoric of manliness and
effeminateness refers to moral postures more than genital structures, much
of their much-noted irrationality evaporates.
If we persist, however, in reading antitheatrical discourse pathologically, we cannot help but come to imperfect conclusions, as Levine does
when she decides that the subjective model set forth in the antitheatrical tracts is profoundly contradictory. Levine reaches this verdict after
observing that antitheatrical authors maintain—at one and the same
time—that the self is
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Fixed and stable
Pliant and susceptible
Inherently womanish
Inherently monstrous and beastly
Inherently empty

Taking these various alternatives to be mutually exclusive, Levine interprets their copresence in antitheatrical discourse as evidence of its underlying irrationality, yet this alleged incoherence is more illusory than
actual, as becomes clear when we put pressure on points 1 and 2. Though
Levine claims that the antitheatricalists contradict themselves by suggesting that the self is simultaneously stable and susceptible, these authors
do not describe the self as being stable or fixed. They routinely affirm,
as Prynne does in Histrio-mastix, that God has apportioned “a uniforme
distinct and proper being” to every creature.10 But “uniforme distinct and
proper” is not the same as “fixed and stable.” Whereas the second set of
terms implies that change is impossible (an ontological claim), the first set
of terms implies only that change is imprudent (an ethical claim). Neither
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Barish nor Levine is mindful of this difference, but it remains meaningful
nonetheless.11 Attending to it allows us to achieve a more precise understanding of antitheatrical discourse. Specifically, it enables us to see that
when antitheatrical authors insist upon the propriety and distinctness
of our divinely ordained identities, they are not claiming that we cannot change who we are but only that we cannot do so without risking
condemnation (for who are we to second-guess God, trying to alter or
improve upon his omniscient assignments?). Far from supposing the self
to be immutable or inalterable, the antitheatricalists are well aware that it
can be fashioned and refashioned. This is precisely why the dissimulative
practices of the theaters are so dangerous. Such being the case, the antitheatricalists stress the importance of divinely ordained identities—not to
say that these are fixed and stable but only to say that it would be good if
they were.12
Similarly, the antitheatricalists do not necessarily contradict themselves when they imply that human beings are inherently womanish,
monstrous, and beastly, all at the same time. To a modern reader, these
categories might seem disparate or mutually exclusive—so much so
that the antitheatricalists’ failure to distinguish between them appears
utterly nonsensical. To an early modern Englishman, though, those who
are comprehended within these various categories are more or less alike
in their collective incontinence. Lacking the self-restraint and integrity
that are associated throughout the period with men and manliness, they
are equivalently, even interchangeably, “unmanly.” In other words, the
antitheatricalists do not contradict themselves when they say that each of
us is inherently womanish, monstrous, and beastly because each of these
terms can indicate roughly the same thing—namely, a state of appetitive
sensuality that is imagined to be the opposite of idealized manhood.13
But even if this is true, how can the self be inherently monstrous
and womanish if it is also supposed to be inherently empty? For
Levine, this is highly problematic. She contends that the subjective
model put forward by the antitheatricalists is “profoundly contradictory, for, according to its logic, the self is both inherently monstrous
and inherently nothing at all” (12). Levine’s objection that selves cannot be something and nothing would seem to be axiomatic. Yet we
might wonder whether the objection applies in this instance, inasmuch as the antitheatricalists tend not to regard “unmanly” conditions
like effeminacy or monstrousness as positive states but as negative
ones characterized by absence and lack (e.g., no phallus, no reason,
no restraint, no virtue). This is a sexist construction, to be sure, but
it does much to dissolve the dichotomy of something/nothing. When
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manliness is equated with plenitude and presence, it stands to reason
that a nything and everything “unmanly” would tend toward nothingness. Contextualized in this manner, the antitheatrical claim that
selves are inherently empty and inherently monstrous is not so much
illogical as apposite, for monstrousness is itself a kind of emptiness: a
condition of critical lack that is antithetical to the “manly” attributes
of presence, prudence, and perfection.
This conceptualization is firmly grounded in early modern sexism but
also has roots in early modern theology, particularly the Augustinian idea
that sin has no ontological status of its own but is merely the absence of
good. According to this formulation, sin is not a something but a nothing, which quite clearly impinges on the question at hand. If the antitheatricalists envision monstrousness as a state of sinful licentiousness and
understand sinfulness to be a state of moral vacuity, then they need not
embrace irrationality to imply that the self is simultaneously monstrous
and empty. In both instances, what is being indicated is an absence of
virtue and restraint. Were we to put it syllogistically, we might clarify the
logic as follows:
To be monstrous = to be sinful
To be sinful = to be empty
∴ To be monstrous = to be empty
When considered alongside the theological notion that sin is a nothing or
a negation, the antitheatrical allegation that audience members are both
empty and monstrous begins to look a lot less contradictory.
The turn to theology can also ease another apparent contradiction
in antitheatrical discourse—namely, the idea that stage plays can make
audience members both too active and too passive, all volition and no
volition, as Levine puts it. Though Levine contends that these two conditions are antithetical, they amount to much the same thing when one is
of the orthodox opinion that the self is split between a carnal component
and a spiritual component, each with a will of its own. To think along
these lines is to see the will of the flesh perpetually warring against the
will of the spirit, which is a conflict that produces the problem of too
much and too little. If it is true that stage plays excite the carnal will and
enfeeble the spiritual will, then those who attend plays would of course be
rendered too active and too passive: too active in pursuing sinful pleasure
and too passive in resisting it. These same audience members would also
exhibit too much volition and too little volition: too much as concerns the
depraved carnal will and too little as concerns the upright spiritual will.
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Strictly speaking, such a construction might qualify as incoherent, but its
incoherence springs from the metaphysical duality of the human subject,
not the irrationality of the antitheatricalists. Although the antitheatricalists bounce back and forth between all volition and no volition, this is not
because they are unthinking extremists but because they are committed
Christian dualists.
Once we come to terms with the Christian dualism of the antitheatricalists, we become capable of seeing reason where others have seen unreason,
as in Anthony Munday’s paradoxical assertion that stage plays can bring
men “to like euen those whome of them-selues they abhor.”14 For Levine,
such a claim makes no sense. To believe that the theater can co-opt one’s
desires so completely, she contends, one must resort to “magical thinking”
and regard the playhouse as a place of enchantment where patrons are
transformed into “puppets” or “passive will-less robots” (12). However,
the idea that one might be attracted to what one abhors is at least as much
biblical as it is magical. The apostle Paul speaks of this very thing in his
epistle to the Romans, remarking that “the good that I would I do not: but
the evil which I would not, that I do,” and “that which I do I allow not:
for what I would, that do I not; but what I hate, that do I.”15 Paul’s point,
however, is not that he is a passive, will-less robot but that he is a carnally minded man, “sold under sin.”16 Torn between the righteous desires
of his mind and the wicked desires of his flesh, he is unable to walk a
straight line: “[W]ith the mind I myself serve the law of God; but with
the flesh the law of sin.”17 Munday’s susceptible spectators are in the same
situation—which means that bewitchment is not the only way of accounting for the perversions of the playhouse. In order to get us to act against
our own better judgment, playmakers do not need to strip away our will
in some mysterious, supernatural fashion. They simply need to activate
the illicit desires that are already inside us, causing these illicit desires to
overpower our nobler impulses. Insofar as Munday portrays playmakers
as doing just that, he does not ravel himself in magical thought so much
as he rehearses a recognizably Protestant phenomenology of temptation.
Nevertheless, we must go further if we are to exonerate fully the antitheatricalists from the charge of “magical thinking,” for Levine sees them
as pointing to not one but two magical processes. In the first process,
watching leads inevitably to doing, such that audience members compulsively imitate the actions they see on stage. In the second process, watching leads inevitably to being, such that audience members assume the
identity of the actor before them, quite literally becoming another person.
Calling this second process “the deeper belief in magic,” Levine attempts
to prove its prevalence in antitheatrical polemic by quoting a passage
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from Playes Confuted (1582) wherein Gosson reproduces Xenophon’s
account of a production of Bacchus and Ariadne:
When Bacchus rose up, tenderly lifting Ariadne from her
seate, no small store of curtesie passing betwene them,
the beholders rose up, every man stoode on tippe toe, and
seemed to hover over the playe, when they sware, the company sware, when they departed to bedde; the company
presently was set on fire, they that were married posted
home to their wives; they that were single, vowed very
solemly, to be wedded.18
According to Levine, the formulaic repetitions in this passage (rising up,
standing on tiptoe, swearing oaths) imply that the mind of the actor is
impressed upon each onlooker in such a way that “the spectator quite
literally takes on the identity of the actor” (13). “If we are to understand
such anecdotes,” Levine writes, “we shall have to account for the irrational idea that one person could be changed into another” (14).
In order to see this passage as asserting a magical transformation, however, we must follow Levine in equating affective state with identity, imagining that anyone who feels sexual stirrings similar to those being felt by
some other person has literally become that other person. Such a belief is
extreme, and I do not see the passage as endorsing it. Although the spectators here have clearly become aroused, there is little to support the claim
that they have assumed new or different identities because each seeks to
satisfy himself or herself in the manner most suited to his or her real-life
situation, prior to and apart from the performance: those who are married
go home to their spouses, and those who are single resolve to marry. Had
any of these individuals actually become Bacchus, only Ariadne would
have fit the bill—and heaven help the poor actor who would have been
forced to fend off an entire audience, each member pursuing him in the
name and person of Bacchus. Of course, things do not fall out this way.
These onlookers have not become Bacchus; they have merely become as
aroused as they suppose Bacchus to have been. Once again, Levine misrepresents the antitheatrical argument by making it more literal and more
sensational than it actually is.
This is not to say that antitheatrical discourse should never be read
literally. To be sure, there is more in it than metaphor. When Stephen
Gosson, for instance, advises that “[t]he Poetes that write playes, and they
that present them vpon the Stage, studie to make our affections ouerflow,”
the association he makes between emotions and fluidity is more than just
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figurative.19 This much is clear when Gosson’s claims are situated within
a humoral context. As Gail Kern Paster has shown, the humoral theories
that prevailed in the early modern period posited the passions to be closely
and functionally associated with the four bodily humors—so much so
that the passions were not merely considered to be analogous to the liquid
states and fluid forces of nature but were actually taken to be liquid forces
of nature in their own right, operating within the body just as the forces
of wind and waves operate in the natural world.20 Seen from this angle,
Gosson’s propensity to talk about the playhouse as a place of dangerous
fluidity acquires an unexpectedly literal dimension. He is not just waxing poetic when he warns that stage plays can carry us beyond our depth
on deadly currents of passion and desire. Underlying all his references
to unruly waves, overwhelming floods, and gaping gulfs is a material,
humoral reality.21 This, then, is one area in which a literalistic approach
strikes me as both plausible and productive. If we really want to take the
antitheatricalists at their word, I submit that we should focus less on the
idea that stage plays can anatomically effeminate us and more on the claim
that they can make us overflow.
Yet the humoral framework that Paster has painstakingly reconstructed can shed even more light on antitheatrical discourse inasmuch
as it effectively normalizes the antitheatricalists’ fears regarding the susceptibility of spectators subjected to the sights and sounds of the playhouses. As Paster’s work helps us see, such fears are wholly consonant
with a humoral conceptualization of the self. The humoral self is characterized by extreme corporeal porosity and openness, which in turn
translates into a high degree of emotional volatility and instability. A
post-Enlightenment enthusiasm for rational choice and self-restraint is
entirely anachronistic to this model of the self, for the continual fluxes
and flows experienced by the humoral subject were understood to be so
strong and unceasing as to prevent the force of reason from encompassing or even adequately accounting for individual behavior. As Paster
remarks, adherents of humoralism were bound to take psychophysiology seriously and to call for external social disciplines because this was
part and parcel of “their governing paradigm for theorizing the bodily
wellsprings of human behavior.”22 From a humoral perspective, the antitheatrical view that internal dispositions and outward actions are highly
susceptible to—even determined by—one’s situation and surroundings
makes a great deal of sense.
These ideas are also congruent with the period’s philosophies and
physiologies of perception. As Stephanie Shirilan has observed, the openness and porosity of the early modern self is not only a humoral condition;
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early modern faculty psychology also constructed the self as open and
impressionable. Theorists of cognition often tied this susceptibility to the
operation and influence of the imaginative faculties, which were thought
capable of forging sympathetic identifications so strong as to collapse
the distance between self and other. However, these sympathetic links
were not without a material basis, as well, since all bodies were believed
to be physically connected, communicating with one another through a
common medium animated by spirit or pneuma. As a result of all this
interconnectedness, interpersonal transference was almost inevitable, and
writers ranging from Robert Burton to Francis Bacon marvel at the ease
with which somatic experience is sympathetically and mimetically passed
from one individual to another—as when one man yawns and another
follows suit or when one man urinates and a second is provoked to do the
same. According to Shirilan, early modern cognitive psychology clearly
fosters the belief that performed bodily symptoms can “[infect] the perceiver with the impulse to reproduce the observed behaviour—regardless
of the authenticity of this witnessed performance.”23 Such a supposition,
it must be acknowledged, is the antitheatrical argument in a nutshell.
Consequently, it cannot be said that the antitheatricalists are alone in
imagining that playacting might prove both contagious and corrupting.
In the early modern period, the antitheatrical perspective on the power of
performance, the malleability of the self, and the weakness of the will is
consistent with current scientific models.
Of course, an early modern Englishman need not have specialized
knowledge of faculty psychology, Galenic humoralism, or Paracelsian
pneumatism to entertain the idea that one could be overtaken or corrupted
by external influences, even when unwilling. During this time of plague
and contagion, as Carla Mazzio observes, infection was a constant worry,
with each new affliction or outbreak offering a frightening reminder of
one’s own susceptibility. The all-too-easy transference of disease from one
person to the next readily confirmed that one could be touched at a distance, fatally compromised by exposure to unwholesome sights, sounds,
and smells.24 This corporeal vulnerability, in turn, came to betoken spiritual and moral vulnerabilities of the same order. As Margaret Healy
shows, early modern efforts to ascertain how syphilis and the plague were
communicated led to analogous speculations about less tangible transferences. When malignant qualities of an airy or material nature were
understood to be invisibly transmitted and insensibly incorporated, it
stood to reason that the same would happen with moral, spiritual, and
psychological qualities. Far from being figurative, these types of transferences were regarded as real phenomena. As Healy writes, “[P]sychic
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and moral ‘touching’ was a particular preoccupation of the late sixteenth
and the first half of the seventeenth century,” not only rendered plausible
but also empirically sanctioned by the passage of plague contagion.25 Such
preoccupations, it should be apparent, both undergird and uphold the
antitheatrical idea that entire assemblies can be infected by eloquent or
affecting performances. In many ways, early modern antitheatricalism is
a logical extension and application of early modern epidemiologies.
From this follows my contention that the antitheatricalists’ concerns
about the corrupting influence of the theater are of a piece with prevailing early modern paradigms. Their ideas about the self and its susceptibilities are not so much paranoid as Protestant, not so much abnormal as
empirical. Notwithstanding our tendency to portray the antitheatricalists as outliers, many of the distinctions we would draw between those
who attack the stage and those who defend it are difficult to maintain.
As Peter Lake perceptively notes, the antitheatricalists and the apologists
not only invoke “the same moralizing and providential frameworks” but
also share “core structuring assumptions” about such things as “order and
disorder, providence, sin and the devil, social and gender hierarchy and
subordination, vice, virtue and the good death.”26
With respect to this overlap, it is useful to set Sir Philip Sidney alongside
Stephen Gosson, considering the foremost Elizabethan apologist in conjunction with one of the period’s most prominent antipoetic authors. The comparison is somewhat natural, since Sidney apparently intended his Apology
for Poetrie (1595) as a refutation of Gosson’s Schoole of Abuse (1579),27 yet one
of the curiosities of Sidney’s treatise is the way it ends up endorsing many
of the assumptions and arguments found in Gosson’s work. Like Gosson,
Sidney declares the right use of poetry to be the inculcation of valor and
courage. Like Gosson, Sidney asserts poetry’s power to make things memorable, immediate, and attractive. And, like Gosson, Sidney maintains that
poetry appeals to the senses and passions so powerfully as to move us—
almost irresistibly—to perform actions we would otherwise avoid. Taking
all of this into account, it is hard to quarrel with Jacob Bronowski’s claim
that “Sidney’s theory of poetry and Gosson’s are the same.”28
The common ground, however, extends beyond this, for Sidney
expresses agreement not only with Gosson’s general theory of poetry
but also with a number of his particular accusations. Speaking of the
comedies currently performed in England, Sidney openly admits that
“naughty playmakers and stagekeepers have justly made [them] odious.”29
Elsewhere, he allows that the tragedies and comedies presented on the
professional stage are “not without cause cried out against.”30 And in perhaps the most damning concession of all, Sidney says, “I yield that poesy
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may not only be abused, but that being abused, by the reason of his sweet
charming force, it can do more hurt than any other army of words.”31
In the Apology, Sidney will attempt to finesse this point by insisting that
poetry’s potential for good outweighs its potential for bad, but before
long Sidney seems to have backed away from this optimistic appraisal.
Although Sidney died about five years after finishing the Apology, even
this short span appears to have been sufficient for him to think better
of his apologetic enthusiasm. According to his early biographers, Sidney
became so troubled by the immoral possibilities of his own writings that
he eventually desired to destroy them. Thomas Moffet relates that, in his
later years Sidney “[came] to fear . . . that his Stella [1591] and his Arcadia
[1590] might render the souls of readers more yielding instead of better”
and therefore wished to have them burned. Similarly, Fulke Greville
reports that Sidney grew certain that the beauty of his prose romance, The
Arcadia, “was more apt to allure men to evil than to frame any goodness
in them” and consequently “bequeathed no other legacy but the fire to
this unpolished embryo.”32 This trajectory is not unlike Gosson’s, another
poet who became increasingly uncomfortable with poetry’s allure and
ultimately concluded it would be better to go without its pleasures than
undergo its temptations. Though antitheatricalism is supposed to be the
pathological position, it is worth noting that the preeminent apologist of
the era appears to have moved in that direction as he matured.
This is not to say that Sidney and Gosson are indistinguishable. They
clearly diverge in a number of ways.33 But when it comes to overarching
theories—about poetry, imagination, and the fallen will—they align
more closely than we often admit. To recognize this is to begin to see that
we cannot entirely account for early modern antitheatricalism by alleging that its proponents were paranoid. Yet, if this is the case, how can
we explain the popularity of the professional stage? If most English men
and women shared the core structuring assumptions of the antitheatrical
authors, why did so many ignore their counsel? The answer, I believe,
has more to do with risk assessment and risk tolerance than anything else.
I submit that the majority of early moderns would have acknowledged
the moral dangers of playgoing as readily as we moderns acknowledge
the physical dangers of motorcycling or skydiving. In such pursuits, what
separates the participant from the nonparticipant is not a set of differing ideologies so much as variable evaluations of the activity’s pleasures
and benefits, relative to its risks. I do not think early modern playgoers
imagined that they were safe from harm—only that the risks they were
running were acceptable and/or manageable. In this sense, what sets the
antitheatricalist apart is an abundance of caution, not an absence of reason.
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If we continue to equate antitheatricalism with insanity, however, we
obscure the acute moral problems playacting posed in Shakespeare’s day.
We also give short shrift to a rather rich set of texts. Men like Munday,
Gosson, and Stubbes can tell us a great deal about the early modern
stage, if only we take them seriously. To date, a handful of critics have
endeavored to do this, and their analyses have been both rewarding
and revelatory. Ágnes Matuska, for instance, has conscientiously considered why antitheatrical authors do not allow that one could be a
chaste onlooker—that one could remain unaffected by a given act or
performance by choosing not to participate in or approve it. Rather than
dismiss the idea as absurd, Matuska uses it to think through early modern staging practices, particularly those that recruit or require audience
involvement. What emerges from this analysis is a better understanding
of the uniquely participatory nature of the early modern playhouse.34
David Hawkes, for his part, has read the antitheatricalists alongside
Marx, concluding that they are not cranks but insightful cultural critics, perceiving better than most the consequences of commercializing
the theaters and commodifying their offerings. As Hawkes shows, the
opponents of the stage offer “a coherent and sophisticated critique of
the ideological and psychological effects of a commodity culture.”35
Finally, Bryan Reynolds has seriously entertained the antitheatrical
claims either disregarded or derided by critics like Stephen Greenblatt,
Jean Howard, and Laura Levine—and has subsequently developed one
of the most sophisticated and compelling accounts of the early modern
theater. According to Reynolds, antitheatrical writers were right on
many fronts, for the early modern playhouse really was an exceptional
cultural apparatus, capable of cultivating a unique form of deviance
that Reynolds calls “transversality.” Reynolds persuasively argues—in
agreement with antitheatrical polemic—that the early modern stage
was a supremely powerful sociopolitical conductor, radiating transversal power in such a way that “everyone exposed to the public theater’s
efflorescing reach, including its most fervent enemies, was infected with
transversal thought.”36
As valuable as these “nonpathological” readings have proven to
be, they remain relatively rare, overshadowed by the received notion
that the antitheatricalists are irrational. In this essay, I have sought to
contest this characterization by carefully parsing the antitheatricalists’
claims and by showing that these claims are of a piece with humoral
theory, faculty psychology, Protestant theology, and early modern
lived experienced. Assuredly, one need not fear magic, monsters, or
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vanishing penises to worry about the effects of the stage: these worries were straightforwardly indicated by the prevailing worldview. To
believe in original sin and the fallen will, to believe in the passions and
the humors, to believe in the powers of sympathy and imagination—to
believe in any or all of these early modern orthodoxies—is to know, at
some level, that the antitheatricalists have reason, that playhouses can be
perilous places, indeed.
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NOTES
1. Google Scholar (accessed 4 November 2016, scholar.google.com) records no fewer than
1,196 citations of Jonas Barish’s The Antitheatrical Prejudice and 292 citations of Laura
Levine’s Men in Women’s Clothing. To put this latter figure in perspective, it is worth
noting that out of all the single-authored literary critical studies of early modern
England published in 1994 (when Levine’s book appeared), only seven monographs are
credited with 250 citations or more (Table 1).
Table 1. 1994 monographs with more than 250 citations, per Google Scholar
Author
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Richard Helgerson Forms of Nationhood

Citations
1,035

Bruce Smith

Homosexual Desire in
Shakespeare’s England

510

John Gillies

Shakespeare and the Geography
of Difference

375

Jean Howard

The Stage and Social Struggle

366

Frances Dolan

Dangerous Familiars

296

Laura Levine

Men in Women’s Clothing

292

Philippa Berry

Of Chastity and Power

259

It is also worth noting that the opening chapter of Levine’s book was initially
published in the pages of Criticism (see Laura Levine, “Men in Women’s Clothing:
Antitheatricality and Effeminization from 1579 to 1642,” Criticism 28, no. 2 [1986]:
121–43), and that Google Scholar shows an additional 117 citations of this essay, increasing to 409 the number of citations of Levine's work on antitheatricalism
2. See Jonas Barish, “Puritans and Proteans,” in The Antitheatrical Prejudice (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1985), 80–131. Barish directly quotes William Prynne

248

Kent R. Lehnhof

sixteen times in the chapter. No other English moralist is directly quoted more than five
times (Table 2).
Table 2. Authors’ quotations of William Prynne
Author
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William Prynne

16

William Perkins

5

Stephen Gosson

4

Phillip Stubbes

4

Anthony Munday

2

Stephen Batman

1

Robert Burton

1

J. Cocke

1

John Northbrooke

1

William Rainolds

1

Richard Sibbes

1

Samuel Willard

1

George Wither

1
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Cambridge Studies in Renaissance Literature and Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1994), 15; hereafter cited parenthetically in the text.
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A6v–A7r (my emphasis).
6. Phillip Stubbes, The Anatomie of Abuses (London: Richard Jones, 1583), sig. F5v.
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rule of the words of God. (Gosson, Plays Confuted, sig. E3v)
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esp. 19. One hundred years after Milton and two hundred years after Gosson, gendered
terms like “manly” are still being used to describe moral states, apart from a natomical
ones. In a document no less central than the Declaration of Independence, the US
founding fathers cite with approval the “manly firmness” with which the colonialists
have opposed George III’s “invasions on the rights of the people” (see http://www
.constitution.org/usdeclar.htm).
10. Prynne, Histrio-mastix, sig. X4r.
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(“fixed and stable”) (see Barish, Antitheatrical Prejudice, 94; and Levine, Men in Women’s
Clothing, 10).
12. Bryan Reynolds makes a similar point in response to claims by Jean Howard and Linda
Woodbridge that early modern polemicists present social identity as “preordained and
fixed” (Howard’s phrase). According to Reynolds, antitheatricalists who insist upon
divinely ordained identities are not arguing for the fixity of identity but for the fixing of
identity (see Bryan Reynolds, Becoming Criminal: Transversal Performance and Cultural
Dissidence in Early Modern England [Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press,
2002], esp. 143–44).
13. The interconnection of monstrousness and womanishness is still at play in
eighteenth-century America. Toby L. Ditz shows that letters written by m
 erchants
in Philadelphia complain of the unmanly acts of deceitful business partners
by comparing these partners to both women and monsters (“Shipwrecked; or,
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in Eighteenth-Century Philadelphia,” Journal of American History 81, no. 1 [1994]:
51–80, esp. 60–61).
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